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Good morning.  As the first speaker on the first panel, I’d like to break 
the proverbial ice.  Perhaps it is best to do so in two ways.  First, I’d like to 
set out some introductory concepts that may be helpful for listeners (and 
eventual readers) who may not necessarily be well versed with details 
regarding child soldiering.  Second, I will identify several challenges that I 
see as quite pressing for international law and policy when it comes to 
transitioning children from armed violence to a better place.  In the interests 
of clarity and direction, let me say that I will posit seven key challenges. 
Before I go any further, however, I’d like to thank Professor Amann and 
the Georgia Law School for hosting such an auspicious event.  What is more, 
Madame Prosecutor, I would like to thank you and your staff for the 
herculean efforts that you are undertaking to address the scourge of child 
soldiering.  Tens of thousands of children worldwide become militarized.  A 
much larger number of children become affected by militarization.  Child 
soldiering exists on every continent.  It is not limited only to places where 
international courts presently operate.  It ebbs and flows but persists, 
emerging in recent years in Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, and 
Mali—to name only a few places.  Many adults, moreover, may have entered 
military forces and armed groups as children.  Dominic Ongwen is an 
obvious example.  
It may be helpful to begin with some definitions.  Who is a child soldier?  
I understand this term to be informed by the 1997 Cape Town Principles and 
the 2007 Paris Principles. The Paris Principles eschew the phrase “child 
soldiers,” in fact, and prefer the undoubtedly more accurate “children 
associated with armed forces or armed groups.”1  The Paris Principles 
phraseology is more accurate since it recognizes that militarized children do 
much more than serve as combatants.  The term child soldiers, albeit popular, 
has also become somewhat antiquated.  While accurate, or perhaps because 
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of its accuracy, the Paris Principles language is tongue-tying and tongue-
twisting.  I am therefore going to use the term child soldiers as shorthand. 
But I understand a child soldier as including spies, sentries, cooks, porters, 
sex slaves, forced conjugal partners, as well as fighters (whether carrying 
weapons or not).  Also, in line with both the Cape Town Principles and the 
Paris Principles, the age of eighteen is the terminal point of the protected 
category of who is a child soldier.2  The category therefore is chronological 
and fixed, rather than liminal and experiential. 
In my book Reimagining Child Soldiers, I argue that it is very important 
to acknowledge, and even embrace, the reality that there is no “typical” child 
soldier.  It is imperative to transcend sensationalism and stereotype when 
talking about child soldiering.  A great diversity of experience arises among 
children who become associated with armed forces and armed groups. 
Roughly 40% of such children are girls.  Some are very young, while 
many—likely a clear majority worldwide—are in the fifteen to seventeen 
year old age cohort.3 
Many children end up as child soldiers because they are abducted, 
brutalized, and tortured.  Others, however, also exercise a level of initiative 
in coming forward and either enlisting or, in some cases, affirmatively 
participating in armed groups and armed forces.  Youth politicization, and 
actualizing politics though martial activities, is not implausible: some 
children join movements to try to build a better world.  Many child soldiers 
are rescued by humanitarian interventions, but some exit militarized life 
entirely on their own.  Only few child soldiers are involved in the serial 
commission of what would be acts of atrocity against civilian populations, 
often including other children.  Many child soldiers are victims of brutal 
indignities.  I believe that to effectively deter child soldiering, we need to 
recognize the diversity and the kaleidoscopic nature of militarization and 
how it affects children.  
Let me turn to the seven challenges I posit for international law and 
policy.  I raise these in the spirit of improving the path of law and policy, and 
for enhancing our imagined legal consciousness, when it comes to deterring 
child soldiering and reintegrating children affected by militarization and war.   
First, while we can hope that transitions move societies from armed 
conflict to peace, in reality, transitions proceed from armed conflict to 
renewed armed conflict.  Even in transitions toward peace, in other words 
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away from armed conflict, the post-conflict society may not be free from 
violence (criminal violence for example) or autocracy, both of which may 
impact negatively upon juveniles.  Violence exists in peacetime as well.  
Violence that is public in nature and committed by and against children in 
times of armed conflict may, after armed conflict, turn into violence 
committed by and against children that percolates into private spheres, the 
household, and the city block.  International lawyers need to recognize that 
public violence in armed conflict will not necessarily be eradicated just 
because armed conflict ends.  Violent masculinities, in particular, may 
operationalize themselves in a variety of private contexts that elude the gaze 
of the international lawyer and, in many instances, the law altogether 
(whether substantively or as a matter of application).  Transitional justice 
does not have a good track record in dealing with this situation.  South Africa 
may be evoked as a poignant example. 
Second challenge: I think we need to recognize that the mental health of 
former child soldiers may not necessarily be as fragile as we may fear.  Child 
soldiers are resistant, and in many cases resilient.  Their strengths need to be 
leveraged in post-conflict transitions and in building a citizen-empowered 
polity.  But this is not to say that child soldiering’s effects are innocuous or 
incidental.  Great pain abounds despite the resilience.  In addition to 
psychological trauma and recovery, it’s very important for former child 
soldiers to receive occupational training, medical care and rehabilitation for 
physical injuries, conflict resolution skills, education, and job preparation.  
It’s a tall order, to be sure.  But focusing excessively on mental health 
aspects diffuses attention from the diversity of mechanisms and tools that 
may enhance individual recovery and collective well-being. 
Third: criminal trials for adult recruiters, abductors, and enlisters of 
children are central to the accountability process.  The Lubanga conviction 
has considerable expressive value; as did the Special Court for Serra Leone’s 
convictions on child soldier related charges.4  However, in and of 
themselves, these prosecutions and sentences are not enough.  These trials 
can only deliver so much.  Their value should not be over-marketed, nor 
should international lawyers over-promise.  A pressing need arises to 
deracinate the structural factors that conspire to fuel the conditions in which 
young people become militarized.  Also helpful is to seriously consider much 
broader remedial action, including, reparative justice and remedial justice.  If 
we focus exclusively on courtrooms and jailhouses, we are hewing to a very 
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narrow approach instead of engaging with the pluralistic possibilities that the 
law has to offer.   
The fourth challenge revolves around the false simplicity of categorizing 
age.  If the law takes eighteen as a chronological benchmark, it may come 
down very hard on people in 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 year-old age bracket.  
Compelling neuro-scientific evidence suggests that physiological 
development continues to ferment in the eighteen to twenty-five age bracket.  
Conversely, persons in the sixteen and seventeen year-old bracket may have 
more in common with their contemporaries just over the hump of adulthood 
than their contemporaries in the thirteen to fifteen cohort.  If it makes a lot of 
hay out of a simple birthday, the law may come down very exigently and 
very heavily on young adults, even though young adults may suffer 
comparable harms and constraints in times of conflict to those faced by older 
juveniles.  Perhaps it is the ineluctable fate of law simultaneously to indulge, 
on the one hand, while being too exigent, on the other.  Such is the 
inevitability of law’s predilection to draw bright-lines.  And bright lines are 
simple.  Their simplicity, however, belies the much thornier realities of 
safeguarding human rights where it really matters—not in the law books but 
on the ground.  Human rights activists might look more critically at the 
convenience of chronological bright lines so that we can do better, however 
inconveniently. 
Fifth, as I argue in my book, transitional justice is useful when it comes to 
facilitating the reintegration and rehabilitation of militarized youth, while 
also helping to reconstruct societies that have been plagued by violence, 
including violence committed against children and violence committed by 
children.5  While I eschew criminal trials, restorative, reparative, and, in 
some instances, customary and ceremonial forms of justice can play a very 
valuable role in re-anchoring children implicated in the commission of acts 
of atrocity within society while also delivering some sense of justice for 
victims and survivors.  Categories of victim and perpetrator become very 
ambiguous in places where children act violently, and are made to act 
violently, and fine-grained methods of transitional justice that eschew the 
binary reductionism of penal sanction may be particularly apposite in such 
contexts.  Many individuals who suffer in conflict at the hands of children 
may also be children.  These children, too, have a right to see their best 
interests promoted. 
Let me turn to my final two points. International law and policy would do 
well to recognize, and revel in, the fundamental tension that lurks within 
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children’s rights discourse.  On the one hand, international human rights law 
protects juveniles.  On the other hand, international human rights law 
emancipates and empowers juveniles.  We need to do better at building a 
culture of juvenile rights.  Yet when lawyers and policy-makers present   
children as enfeebled, as helpless and hapless, as victimized, broken, and  
incapable—and when we articulate that as a basis to protect children—we 
may very well be doing them a disservice.  Vibrant citizenship, juvenile 
rights, and stakeholdership assume capacity, ability, confidence, strength, 
and agency.  Protecting children may, therefore, be in tension with 
recognizing their political will and capacity to make important choices for 
themselves: freedom of expression, freedom of association, reproductive 
rights, their ability to have input in custodial determinations, their autonomy 
at times to refuse medical treatment.  In many post-conflict societies, age-
driven gerontocratic pressures that may create conditions for children to 
become militarized often persist after militarization ends.  These lingering 
pressures, then, serve as a conduit for re-militarization or re-criminalization.  
One way to quash, or at least relieve these pressures, is to generate a robust 
culture of juvenile rights that views young people as able to discharge their 
obligations, as being able to be held responsible for their conduct, to 
command the respect of others, and to claims societal and communal 
obligations.   
My final point: The focus on militarized youth, in my opinion, should not 
divert our attention from children who are criminalized in violent social 
contexts that fall short of the elements of armed conflict.  Patterns of 
recruitment in gangs and syndicates that engage in drug trafficking, sex 
trafficking, and dangerous labor practices, often bear similarities to patterns 
of recruitment into armed groups and armed forces.  In the end, a holistic 
view of youth who endure, transcend, suffer, and propagate violence is, in 
my opinion, a propitious path forward to build on the significant 
accomplishments effected by law and policy over the past two decades.  
Thank you for your time. 
  
